IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEON R. DONGELEWICZ, et al., : 3:CV-95-0457 Plaintiffs : (Judge McCLURE) vs. : FIRST EASTERN BANK, et al., : Defendants :
M E M O R A N D U M |
|
September 23, 1997 |
BACKGROUND:
Plaintiffs in this class action suit are the lot owners
in a 3856-acre recreational housing development called the Valley
of Lakes (the community or VOL) which is located in Schuykill and
Luzerne Counties near Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs allege
numerous improprieties on the part of individuals and entities
associated with or having an ownership interest in the community
over the years.
Claims are asserted under RICO1; section 1983;2 the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act;3 the New Jersey Real
Estate Sales Full Disclosure Act;4 and under state law for fraud
and deceit. Plaintiffs allege numerous acts of fraud and
deception on the part of those allegedly responsible for
marketing, developing and maintaining Valley of Lakes over the
years.
Defendant C.B.G., Inc. (C.B.G.), the most recent
developer of the property, is currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, In re: C.B.G. Limited, Bankruptcy No. 5-92-
000525. Defendant PNC Bank, N.A. (PNC Bank) is the primary
secured creditor on VOL property still titled with defendant
C.B.G. Defendants Valley Utilities, Co., Inc. (Valley
Utilities) and the Oneida Water Co. (Oneida) are also currently
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Trustee proposed to sell all assets of
C.B.G., including its remaining ownership interest in Valley of
Lakes to Double Diamond, Inc., (Double Diamond) a Texas
Corporation, and the Valley of Lakes Civic Association (VOLCA).
VOLCA is an unincorporated association of property owners.
On June 26, 1996, the class plaintiffs filed a motion
before this court for injunctive relief in connection with the
proposed sale of C.B.G. assets. Plaintiffs came before this
court seeking a temporary restraining order and\or a preliminary
injunction barring, among other things, PNC Bank from going
forward with efforts to consummate the proposed sale of C.B.G.
assets to Double Diamond and VOLCA and from going forward with
efforts to obtain bankruptcy court approval of the proposed
2
sale.5 Plaintiffs also sought an order barring defendants from
soliciting any exclusions or settlements from class members.
In an order dated June 27, 1996,6 this court denied
plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on their request for a
preliminary injunction. A hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction was held on July 11, 1996. The court
subsequently denied the motion.
Before the court are motions for reconsideration of the
court's order certifying the class filed by defendants First
Eastern Bank and First Eastern Corp. (record document no. 60) and
by defendant MLA Management (record document no. 83). Also
before the court is a motion by plaintiffs for a protective order
(record document no. 74).7
DISCUSSION Motion for reconsideration or to vacate the order certifying the class
Defendants move for reconsideration of the court's
order certifying the class and ask that the order be vacated so
that they have sufficient opportunity to file briefs opposing the
motion. Defendants had an opportunity to file briefs opposing
3
the motion for certification, but chose instead to request a stay
which the court denied. We should perhaps have notified
defendants of that decision in an intermediate step before
deciding the motion. Their reasons for opposing certification
are, however, now before us in the briefs supporting their motion
for reconsideration and we have considered them fully.8
Therefore, rather than vacate class certification at
this point, we will allow the prior order to stand through the
remainder of the discovery period, subject, however, to one
modification. We will amend the prior order granting
certification to provide, however, that defendants have the right
to seek decertification upon the completion of discovery.
We remain convinced for the reasons discussed in the
memorandum which accompanied the certification order that
certification is appropriate at least through the discovery
stage. With some exceptions,9 only after that stage that most of
4
the serious concerns defendants raise about the alleged
inappropriateness of certification come into play.10 See:
Memorandum filed by First Eastern in support of its motion for
reconsideration, record document no. 86 at pp. 14-27).
Intertwined with defendants' request for
reconsideration was a request for leave to conduct discovery on
class certification issues and contentions that defendants were
under the impression such discovery had been stayed and after
defendants learned otherwise and attempted to initiate discovery,
plaintiffs have proved less than cooperative.
Plaintiffs' attitude toward discovery is reflected in
their pending motion for a protective order. Plaintiffs seek a
protective order striking notices of deposition on the ground
that the court had previously denied a motion to compel such
depositions, referencing the court's order no. 1 dated June 19,
5
1996. Defendants seek to depose certain plaintiffs on issues
relating to certification of the class.
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants' request to
explore facts relating to the issue of certification should be
ruled moot because the class has already been certified. We
disagree. Plaintiffs are in the proverbial position of "wanting
it both ways." They opposed discovery on certification issues
prior to the court's ruling on the grounds that such discovery
was inappropriate under the rules. Now having attained their
objective on certification, they again oppose inquiry by
defendants into the appropriateness of this case proceeding as a
class action. They cannot have it both ways.
Defendants will be permitted to conduct discovery into
all matters relevant to the case, including, without limitation,
matters relating to all aspects of the appropriateness of
certification and to matters going to the merits of plaintiffs'
multiple claims.
Further, they will be permitted to rely upon the
information so obtained to move for decertification of the class
if the facts they unearth so merit.
* * *
An order will be entered consistent with this
memorandum. /s/ James F. McClure, Jr. United States District Judge 6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEON R. DONGELEWICZ, et al., : 3:CV-95-0457 Plaintiffs : (Judge McCLURE) vs. : FIRST EASTERN BANK, et al., : Defendants :
O R D E R #1
September 23, 1997
For the reasons stated in the memorandum which will
follow, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The motions for reconsideration filed by
defendants First Eastern Bank and First Eastern Corp. (record
document no. 60) and by defendant MLA Management (record document
no. 83) are granted in part and denied in part.
2. The court has reconsideration certification of the
class and modify the order granting certification to provide that
certification will stand only through the conclusion of
discovery. At that time, defendants may move for
decertification, if the facts so warrant.
3. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order (record
document no. 74) is denied.
4. A separate scheduling order will issue. /s/ James F. McClure, Jr. United States District Judge 8
Footnotes
1 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Back
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Back
3 15 U.S.C. § 1701. Back
4 N.J.S.A. § 45:15-16.47. Back
5 Record document no. 53. Back
6 Record document no. 59. Back
7 Plaintiffs' pending motion for default judgment (record document no. 97) will be disposed of by separate memorandum and order. Back
8 Because of the posture of the motions before us, i.e. a possible, not unjustifiable misunderstanding on defendants, part about the need to file opposing briefs, we do not impose on them the normal, stringent requirements for establishing a right to reconsideration, but rather will consider their motion in the posture of, were this information before the court when the original ruling was made, would it have made a difference? Back
9 With respect to the ethical issues defendants raise bearing on the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel and their fitness to serve as such in light of possible ethical violations, these are issues the court could not resolve without conducting an evidentiary hearing into the alleged instances of impropriety. We will not do so at this time, but will assume that a warning that any conduct by counsel inconsistent with the ethical rules will not be tolerated by the court. If any further instances of alleged misconduct surface, the court will at that time reassess the situation, and if warranted, conduct an evidentiary hearing into the matter. Counsel will be removed as class counsel if allegations of conduct inconsistent with the ethical rules are proven. Back
10 A number of the issues defendants raise related to the alleged lack of commonality of issues stemming from the fact that plaintiffs purchased their property at different times, from different sellers, and based on different information conveyed to them. While it may prove somewhat troublesome to explore these issues in discovery with respect to multiple plaintiffs whose responses will not be uniform, the difficulties which concern defendants only come to a head at the time of trial. Defendants would, in fact, ostensibly have to conduct an inquiry into such facts to support their contention that certification is inappropriate, so we see no harm or prejudice in allowing the class to remain certified through the conclusion of discovery. Back
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